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A Small Illegitimate Power: Executive
Privilege in Rhode Island
I. INTRODUCTION

In mid-July of 2003, the Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode
Island opened a smoke-shop that sold tobacco products tax-free. 1
Pursuant to an investigation, the Rhode Island State Police
obtained a warrant to search the premises. The ensuing raid
erupted into a violent fracas, pitting the police against members of
the tribe. 2 The media publicized film of the incident, allowing
stunned Rhode Island residents to watch as the state police forced
their way past tribe members to enter the smoke-shop. Seven
tribe members were subsequently tried for misdemeanor offenses
that included obstruction, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and
assault. 3 The trial received hours of news footage and involved
high emotions. 4 Ultimately, the jury blamed all parties involved,
including the governor: 5 the jury only convicted three tribe
members, and acquitted the defendants on twelve of the sixteen
6
counts it decided.
Lost in the outskirts of this tale, however, is Rhode Island
Governor Donald A. Carcieri's attempt to block the defendants'
subpoena, which would have required him to testify at trial, by
invoking the executive privilege. 7
Throughout the state's
existence, the people of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
1. Katie Mulvaney, Smoke-shop Trial to Begin, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 13,
2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 825056.
2. Id.

3.

Katie Mulvaney, Court Decision Delays Trial in Smoke-shop Raid,

PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 7, 2007, at Bi, available at 2007 WLNR 17749975.
4. Katie Mulvaney et al., A Split Decision, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 5, 2008,
at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 6427897.

5.

Katie Mulvaney, Smoke-shop JurorsAgree: They're Glad the Trial is

Over, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 13, 2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 6927418.
6. Mulvaney et al., supra note 4.
7. See Mulvaney, supra note 1.
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have had their fair share of reasons not to trust those in the seats
of state and local government.8 Governor Carcieri's invocation of
9
executive privilege may have given state residents another.
The phrase "executive privilege" has several meanings and
connotations. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines it as
"[a] privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, that exempts the executive branch of the federal
government from usual disclosure requirements when the matter
to be disclosed involves national security or foreign policy." 10 A
college dictionary, on the other hand, defines it as "[t]he principle
that members of the executive branch of government cannot
legally be forced to disclose confidential communications when
such disclosure would adversely affect executive operations or
procedures." 1 1 The Ohio Supreme Court recently deemed that the
doctrine is based on the "unassailable" premise-to serve the
public interest-in order protect its governor from compelled
disclosure. 12 This implies that the doctrine itself is "unassailable"
because of its irrefutable premise.

The executive privilege is well established for the federal
executive branch, 13 and many states presume its existence in
their own executive departments. 14 But how can the doctrine be
"unassailable" when the power or protection is not expressly
granted in both the Federal and Rhode Island Constitutions? This
comment explores the murky doctrine of executive privilege
throughout the country, placing a particular emphasis on Rhode
Island, and suggests a comprehensible solution. Part II discusses
the modern history of executive privilege. It begins with a review
of federal case-law, followed by a representative sampling of
8. Examples include everything from the Dorr Rebellion of 1841 to
Plunder Dome. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)
(landmark case that held whether a new government was formed to replace
an existing, corrupt government with little suffrage rights was a political
question and nonjusticiable);

MIKE STANTON, THE PRINCE OF PROVIDENCE

(2003) (discussing the history of corruption in the city of Providence,
culminating in the RICO conviction of former Providence Mayor Vincent
"Buddy" Cianci).
9. See discussion infra Part II.D.
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (7th ed. 1999).
11.

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 479 (3d ed. 2000).

12.
13.
14.

State ex rel. Dann v. Taft (Dann1), 848 N.E.2d 472, 484 (Ohio 2006).
See United States v. Nixon (Nixon 1), 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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gubernatorial uses of the privilege, and finishes with a survey of
Rhode Island's legal landscape as it relates to the privilege. Part
III analyzes the problems surrounding executive privilege,
starting with the absence of any specific grant in the Federal and
Rhode Island Constitutions, followed by rejections of the
commonly used rationales of separation of powers and the public
interest. Finally, Part IV proposes adopting the deliberativeprocess privilege as a viable solution to the problem of protecting
governmental material that legitimately should not be available
for public disclosure.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Presidential Executive Privilege and Nixon
Many presidents, going as far back as George Washington,
have claimed a right to withhold information linked with their
role as a public official. 15 President Washington, for instance,
declined the House of Representatives' request for papers
concerning the negotiation of the Jay Treaty, 16 and President
Thomas Jefferson may have refused, at least initially, to comply
with a subpoena in the treason trial of Aaron Burr. 17 The United
States Supreme Court, however, did not formally recognize a
constitutionally-based executive privilege until 1974, when it
decided the seminal case of United States v. Nixon. 18 There, the
Court established that a privilege protecting presidential
communications from dissemination "is fundamental to the
operation of [gjovernment and inextricably rooted in the
15. See Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 139193, 1395-1405 (1974). Archibald Cox was the Special Prosecutor dismissed by
President Nixon. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firingof Cox; Richardson,
Ruckelshaus
Quit,
WASH.
POST,
Oct.
21,
1973,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nationalllongterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm.
16. JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 211 (1978).
17. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d). The presiding judge was Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting on
circuit. See also Raoul Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83
YALE L.J. 1111, 1111-12 (1974). There seems to be some debate as to whether
Jefferson actually complied with the subpoena. See id. at 1114-15.
18. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 711; see also DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., 2
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 9:3 (3d ed. 2005).
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separation of powers under the Constitution."'19 Although the
Court used the label "executive privilege," a more accurate
classification would be "presidential communication privilege," as
"[g]overnors .

.

. cannot claim the privilege with respect to their
20

communications."
Nixon I stemmed from the Watergate scandal, in which seven
people were indicted on charges that included conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. 2 1 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a
subpoena duces tecum to President Richard Nixon, an unindicted
co-conspirator in the case, ordering him to produce "certain tapes,
memoranda, papers, transcripts or other writings relating to
certain precisely identified meetings between the President and
others." 22 President Nixon did not fully comply with the order
and moved to quash it on the grounds that the material sought
was privileged. 2 3 The district court denied Nixon's motion, and
the President appealed to the Supreme Court. 2 4 There, he
claimed that the separation of powers doctrine prevented judicial
review of his absolute privilege claim. 25 In the alternative, he
argued that a subpoena duces tecum could not overcome his
executive privilege as a matter of constitutional law. 26
The Court reaffirmed the principle established in Marbury v.
Madison27 that the judicial branch determines what the law is in
quickly rejecting Nixon's first contention. 28 Thus, the Court
concluded that it had the power to adjudicate the President's
privilege claim, 29 and further agreed that the President's "interest
in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to
great respect. ' 30 But despite the President's strong interest in
19.

§ 9:3.
20.
21.
22.

Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 708; see also GREENWALD

ET AL., supra note 18, at

See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at § 9:3 n.3.
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 687-88; see also GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at § 9:3.

23. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 688.
24. Id. at 688-90.
25. Id. at 703.
26. Id.
27.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

28. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 703 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 17778).
29.
30.

Id. at 705.
Id. at 712.
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confidentiality, it may be outweighed by the interest in relevant
evidence in criminal trials-an interest that guarantees due
process of law in the criminal justice system. 3 1 To balance these
competing concerns, the Court recognized a qualified privilege for
the President regarding matters that did not involve military,
diplomatic, or national security interests. 32
This privilege,
however, "must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial. ' 33 As one commentator
noted, "[b]ecause the [P]resident's ability to perform his Article II
functions might be impaired if presidential advisers failed to offer
candid advice out of fear of public disclosure of their statements,
the Court accepted the existence of a qualified presidential
communications privilege, even without an explicit constitutional
provision creating it[.]" 34 Finding no error with the district court's
order, the Court affirmed. 35
In a second case in which Nixon (by then no longer president)
asserted executive privilege, the Supreme Court noted that the
privilege was "limited to communications in performance of [a
President's] responsibilities of his office and made in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions. ' 36 It appears that the
Court limited the presidential communications privilege to reflect
the deliberative-process privilege, which protects "only those
37
materials that are both [predecisional] and deliberative."
However, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in its
decision of In re Sealed Case,38 notably expanded the presidential

31. Id. at 712-13.
32. Id. at 706, 713. See also id. at 715 ("The need for confidentiality even
as to idle conversations with associates in which causal reference might be
made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign statesman is
too obvious to call for further treatment."); GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18,
at § 9:3.
33. Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 713; see also GREENWALD ET AL., supranote 18, at

§ 9:3.
34.
35.

GREENWALD ET. AL., supra note 18, at § 9:3.
Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 7i4. Nixon eventually complied with the order.

John Herbers, Tapes Released: President Still Hopeful that the Senate Will
Vote for Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1974, at 1.
36. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977)
(alteration in original) (citations and internal quotations omitted);
GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at §9:4.
37. GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at §9:4; see also infra Part III.D.
38. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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communications privilege beyond the deliberative-process
privilege. 3 9 The case arose when the White House withheld
documents from the Office of the Independent Counsel concerning
whether President William Clinton should retain a cabinet
member. 40 Upon exploring the President's need to protect postdecisional materials or final decisions, in addition to deliberative
materials, the court of appeals held that the presidential
communications privilege "affords greater protection" than the
general deliberative-process privilege. 4 1 Continuing this line of
analysis, the court of appeals held that the presidential
communications privilege extends beyond those communications
that directly include the President: the privilege includes all
communications made or received by White House advisors or
"members of an immediate White House advisor's staff who have
broad and significant responsibility" in advising the President, 4 2
provided "the communications occurred in conjunction with the
process of advising the President. ' 43 The court cautioned that
"[t]he presidential communications privilege should never serve as
a means of shielding information regarding governmental
operations that do not call ultimately for direct decisionmaking by
the President.

' 44

Moreover, at least on the facts of the case, the

court held that the President need not be a party to, nor have
specific knowledge of, the contents of these communications in
order to be covered by the privilege. 4 5 One commentator clarified:
While the presidential communications privilege extends
to conversations involving presidential advisers, the
advisers themselves cannot invoke the privilege. Instead,
only either a sitting [P]resident or the [P]resident during
whose tenure the communications occurred may invoke

39. GREENWALD
121 F.3d 729).

ET AL.,

supra note 18, at §9:4 (citing In re Sealed Case,

40. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 734-35.
41. Id. at 745-46.
42. Id. at 752.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 753 ("[I]n this case there is assurance that even if the President
were not a party to the communications over which the government is
asserting presidential privilege, these communications [concerning
appointment or removal of a cabinet member] nonetheless are intimately
connected to his presidential decisionmaking.").

2008]

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN RHODE ISLAND

665

the presidential communications privilege-regardless as
to whether the one agrees with the other as to the
necessity of invoking the privilege. The [P]resident or
former [P]resident can even invoke the privilege against
allegations of governmental wrongdoing or criminal
activities because the applicability of the presidential
communications privilege does not turn "on the nature of
the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness of the function in the performance of
which the material was sought, and the degree to which
46
the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
In any event, the presidential communications privilege is not
absolute and can be overcome. 47 Nonetheless, as explained below,
high-ranking federal officials are not alone in trying to take
advantage of it.
B. Gubernatorial Use of Executive Privilege
The Arizona Supreme Court was one of the first courts to
recognize the modern notion 48 of executive privilege in the 1952
case of Mathews v. Pyle.49 There, the editor of the Arizona Daily
Star petitioned for the right to review certain documents
pertaining to an investigation Governor Dan Garvey requested
concerning the State Land Commissioner. D° The governor refused
to permit the inspection on the basis that the implied powers of
his office granted him an absolute privilege to withhold
confidential information. 5 1 Rather than recognize an absolute
privilege, the court held that the governor possessed a
46. GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at §9:4 (footnote call numbers
omitted) (quoting Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
47.

Id.

48. From the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century,
state courts mostly dealt with a governor's amenability to mandamus-the
power of a court to compel a governor to perform mandatory or purely
ministerial duties correctly.
See Daniel Farber, Comment, Executive
Privilege at the State Level, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 631, 633 & n.20 (1974); R. E.
Heinselman, Annotation, Mandumus to Governor, 105 A.L.R. 1124 (1936).
49. 251 P.2d 893 (Ariz. 1952).
50. Id. at 894.
51. Id.
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presumptive privilege to deny the right to inspect documents and
that an in camera inspection by the trial court would be necessary
to determine whether the materials sought were "confidential and
privileged or whether their disclosure would be detrimental to the
best interests of the state." 52 Thus, as one commentator put it,
"the court [in Mathews] created an executive privilege which
balances the interests of the parties involved to determine
53
whether disclosure is in the best interests of the state."
In 1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a
qualified executive privilege that protected the governor's
The
confidential communications in Nero v. Hyland.54
controversy in Nero surrounded a character investigation report
about the plaintiff that was compiled for the governor. 5 5 The
plaintiff demanded disclosure of the report in order to defend his
reputation after the governor publicly stated that the report led
him to forgo appointing the plaintiff to the New Jersey Lottery
Commission. 56 The attorney general, however, responded that the
investigation was confidential and would not disclose it. 57 In
holding that the governor possessed an executive privilege, the
court stated that the plaintiffs "interest in disclosure must be
balanced against the public interest in the confidentiality of then
files." 58 The court specifically set out to make the gubernatorial
executive privilege akin to the qualified presidential privilege
created in Nixon /59 Furthermore, without referring to it, Nero
essentially adopted the same balancing rationale as Mathews.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also recognized an
executive privilege for its governor and his or her advisors when it
decided Hamilton v. Verdow in 1980.60 The plaintiff, the personal
representative of a murdered child's estate, sought disclosure of a
report made to the governor of Maryland with regard to a

52. Id. at 896-97.
53. Matthew Singer, Comment, Protecting the Public's Interest in an
Open Government Through the Creation of an Executive Privilege?:The Dann
v. Taft Decisions, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1741, 1747 (2007).
54. 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 1978).
55. Id. at 848.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 852.
59. Id. at 853.
60. 414 A.2d 914, 924 (Md. 1980).
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convicted child murderer who had been released from a state-run
mental hospital prior to committing two murders. 6 1 The governor
requested the report to determine if there were ways to prevent
62
similar occurrences of releasing mentally unstable patients.
The court recognized that the gubernatorial privilege rested on
the doctrine of separation of powers and the public interest, and
found that there was a significant interest in protecting, in
addition to military and diplomatic concerns, a governor's
63
deliberative and mental processes.
The Alaska Supreme Court used Nixon I to justify its creation
of a qualified executive privilege in Doe v. Alaska Superior
Court.6 4 Like Nero, the plaintiff in Doe sought files containing
65
information about her potential appointment to a state office.
Similar to Nixon I, the court based its qualified executive privilege
66
on the necessity of protecting decisionmakers' thought processes.
On the other hand, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently
expressed its disfavor of granting its governor categorical
immunity. Connecticut's office of the governor, in an effort to
stave off impeachment proceedings against Governor John G.
Rowland, moved to quash a subpoena issued to him by the
Connecticut House of Representatives' Select Committee of
Inquiry in 2004.67

The office claimed that the subpoena was

invalid because Rowland was categorically immune from
testifying about his official duties by virtue of the separation of
powers provision of the Connecticut Constitution.68 While the
decision was mostly based on the legislature's role in
impeachment proceedings, the court ultimately rejected
61. Id. at 917.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 924-25.
64. 721 P.2d 617, 623, 625-26 (Alaska 1986).
65. Id. at 619.
66. Id. at 623-25. A decade later, the court reaffirmed the governor's
privilege in CapitalInformation Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29,
33-35 (Alaska 1996).
67. Office of the Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 858 A.2d 709, 71213 (Conn. 2004).
68. Id. at 713. The Connecticut separation of powers provision reads in
pertinent part: "The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit,
those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and
those which are judicial, to another." CONN. CONST.art. II.
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categorical immunity for the governor: "If the separation of powers
doctrine does not give the [P]resident categorical immunity from
suit by a private party while in office, it does not, a fortiori, do so
",,69
with respect to a legislative subpoena to the governor
After the court issued a preliminary decision in this case, but
before it issued its full opinion, Rowland resigned from office and
the Select Committee of Inquiry discontinued its investigation. 70
Ohio is the most recent state 71 to recognize the gubernatorial
executive privilege. In a series of three decisions, 72 the Ohio
Supreme Court sought to determine whether Governor Bob Taft,
through an executive privilege, could prevent disclosure of
documents provided to him by staff members and other executive
branch officials. 73
As noted by one commentator, "[tihese
decisions rel[ied] upon the historical power of the executive in
deciding what privilege
should
protect
[gubernatorial]
communications." 7 4
The court reviewed the common-law
privileges of attorney-client, the judicial mental process privilege,
and other statutory privileges; yet, it could not find any statutory,
constitutional, or common-law basis for gubernatorial executive
privilege. 7 5
Nonetheless, the court held that a qualified

69. Office of the Governor,858 A.2d at 739.
70. Id. at 712 n.1. For the preliminary decision, see Office of the
Governor v. Select Comm. of Inquiry, 850 A.2d 181 (2004).
71. In August of 2007, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
tried to invoke executive privilege in refusing to testify in a homicide trial
concerning thirty-five nursing home patients who drown during Hurricane
Katrina. Emily Kern, Survivor Describes Flooding Scene, BATON ROGUE
ADvoc., Aug. 23, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 16427494. The trial
court rejected her motion to quash the subpoena issued by the defendants,
and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied her writ of review virtually without
opinion. See State v. Mangano, 961 So.2d 1163, 1163-64 (La. 2007) (mem.);
Adam Nossiter, Governor Refuses Blame in 35 HurricaneDeaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2007, at A14. As a result, the state decided to call Governor Blanco
as a witness, probably to mitigate the effect of the defense's line of
questioning. Paul Rioux, Blanco to Testify in St. Rita's Trial Today, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR
16783219.
72. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Dann v. Taft (Dann
I/), 850 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 2006); State ex rel. Dann v. Taft (Dann II1), 853
N.E.2d 263 (Ohio 2006).
73. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 475.
74. Singer, supranote 53, at 1749.
75. Dann 1, 848 N.E.2d at 478-79.
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gubernatorial communications privilege existed in Ohio, 76 a
privilege that protects the "public interest in ensuring that their
[g]overnor can operate in a frank, open, and candid environment
in which information and conflicting ideas, thoughts, and opinions
may be vigorously presented to the [glovernor without concern
follow from public
that unwanted consequences will
dissemination." 7 7 Accordingly, the court recognized the privilege
for the benefit of the public, rather than the governor. 78
C.

Executive Privilege in Rhode Island

The Rhode Island Constitution, like its federal counterpart,
makes no textual reference to the executive privilege.
Traditionally, the separation of powers doctrine in Rhode Island
has favored a strong legislature and weak executive. 79 The
voters, however, approved the separation of powers amendment in
a statewide referendum in 2004, which enacted four separate
constitutional amendments to stop the legislative exercise of
executive power.8 0 The two amendments most relevant to this
81
discussion are article V, concerning the distribution of powers,
and the repeal of article VI, section 10.82 The amendment added
the words "separate and distinct" to article V to describe the three

76. Id. at 484-85.
77. Id. at 484.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature Under
the Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road
Less Traveled, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (criticizing legislative
appointments to administrative bodies, which under the federal separation of
powers doctrine is the realm of the executive).
80. See Liz Anderson, General Assembly Unanimously Approves
Separation of Powers, PROVIDENCE J., July 1, 2003, at 1, available at 2003
WLNR 6760687. For the amended provisions, see R.I. CONST. art. III, § 6
(forbidding state legislators from serving on any state or quasi-public entity
that exercises executive power); id. art. V (adding the words "separate and
distinct" to the description of the three governmental departments-the
legislative, executive, and judicial); Id. art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004) (repealing
the entire section, which allowed the general assembly to exercise powers
that it had historically exercised unless prohibited by the state constitution);
id. art. IX, § 5 (language similar to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution on the appointment of officers).
81. R.I. CONST. art. V.
82. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004).
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government departments. 8 3 The relevancy of this amendment to
the current discussion centers on whether these words allow the
Rhode Island judiciary to interpret the powers of the executive
branch, including whether the governor has an executive
privilege. 8 4 On the other hand, article VI, section 10, which stated
"[t]he [Gleneral [A]ssembly shall continue to exercise the powers it
8 5
has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution,"
was completely repealed by the statewide referendum. This begs
the question whether Rhode Island voters would want the
governor to invoke a power-such as the executive privilege-just
because the office holder always had that power, if an express
allowance to the General Assembly was just repealed by a voter
referendum. 86
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to squarely address
the executive privilege issue. Leading up its recent decision in
State v. Thomas, 8 7 only two other cases even remotely touched
upon the idea of executive privilege.8 8 In Narragansett Indian
Tribe of Rhode Island v. State, the court held that the governor's
powers are limited to those powers expressly granted to him or
her by the Rhode Island Constitution or legislature.8 9 Putting it
another way, the court specifically denied that the governor had
90
any implied powers.
In 2006, the court held in Gaumond v. Trinity Repertory Co.
that it would not create a "school-disabled student privilege,"
similar to an attorney-client privilege. 9 1 The court stated that
"immunity from discovery is in derogation of both common-law

and the general policy favoring discovery, as such, we do not easily
embrace the creation of new privileges." 9 2 The court further noted
83. Compare R.I. CONST. art. V (amended 2004), with R.I. CONST. art. V.
84. See infra Part III.B.
85. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (repealed 2004).
86. See infra Parts III.B, III.D.
87. 936 A.2d 1278 (R.I. 2007).
88. Gaumond v. Trinity Repertory Co., 909 A.2d 512 (R.I. 2006);
Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v. State, 667 A.2d 280 (R.I. 1995).
89. 667 A.2d at 282.
90. Id. at 281-82.
91. 909 A.2d at 516. The student argued that a school and disabled
student share a relationship of confidentiality analogous to the
confidentiality required between an attorney and his or her client. Id.
92. Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moretti v.
Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I. 1991)).
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that it has refused to recognize privileges from statutes having
policies promoting confidentiality, 93 and that privileges must be
explicitly defined and strictly construed 9 4 to prevent them from
being "used as a shield to obstruct proper discovery of relevant
95

information [.]'

D. The Smoke-shop Case
On August 3, 2007, Superior Court Judge Susan E. McGuirl
ruled that Rhode Island Governor Carcieri must testify in the
criminal trial of seven Narragansett Indians arrested in the July
2003 smoke-shop raid. 96 The story of the case began in July 2003
when the state police executed a search warrant to stop the
Narragansett Indian Tribe from selling tobacco products tax-free
at their smoke-shop. 9 7 Local news crews captured the intense
scene on video, and after a court battle not relevant to this
discussion, 98 seven tribe members ended up in court facing
99
misdemeanor charges.
The defendants subpoenaed Carcieri because they sought
testimony regarding orders he gave to the state police.' 0 0 After
the raid, Carcieri announced publicly that he had told the police to
withdraw if they encountered resistance.1 0 1 During pretrial
testimony, former State Police Superintendent Steven Pare ("Col.
Pare") denied that he received those particular instructions from
the governor.' 0 2 Carcieri claimed that an executive testimonial
privilege should preclude him from testifying, but the trial court

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
2006),
99.
Rhode
1.
100.
101.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 516.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moretti, 592 A.2d at 858).
State v. Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278, 1280-81 (2007).
Id. at 1280.
See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 673 (2006).
Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1280. For a summary of the history between
Island and the Narragansett Indian Tribe, see Mulvaney, supra note

Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1280-81.
Katie Mulvaney, Governor Won't Testify in Smoke-shop Raid Trial,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 22, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 25405572.
102. Transcript of Testimony of Colonel Pare and Major Leyden and
Arguments on Motion in Limine at 14-16, State v. Brown, No. W3/07-44A
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 31, 2007).
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disagreed,1 0 3 prompting the governor to petition the Rhode Island
04
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. 1
At both the trial level and on appeal, the governor argued for
an executive testimonial privilege that would require him to
testify only in extraordinary
circumstances.1 0 5
Such
extraordinary circumstances exist-and the executive privilege
can consequently be overcome-only if the official has direct
personal knowledge of a material issue that is highly relevant and
not otherwise available from any source.1 0 6 In recognizing that
this was an issue of first impression in Rhode Island, the trial
court assumed that the state supreme court would adopt the
privilege and thus applied the extraordinary circumstances
test. 107 Judge McGuirl found that each obstacle had been
overcome, as due process gives defendants the right to obtain
necessary witnesses for trial.10 8

She noted that the governor's

involvement in the decision to execute the search warrant was
unusual and that any order he may have issued with regard to the
warrant may have affected how the state police acted. 10 9
Specifically, the governor's orders were relevant to the defendants'
disorderly conduct charges and their defense of excessive force: for
instance, in determining whether the police used excessive force,
the jury must look at the totality of the circumstances, which
includes the governor's instructions concerning the execution of
the warrant.1 1 0 Judge McGuirl also found that the governor's
testimony may be relevant for impeachment and credibility
purposes, due to the apparent inconsistency between the

103. Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1281.
104. Id.
105. See Brief of Petitioner at 12-13, Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278 (No. 2007264-M.P.) [hereinafter Governor's Brief].
106. Id. (citing federal cases).
107. Transcript of Decision: Motion to Compel Testimony of Governor
Carcieri at 9-10, State v. Brown, No. W3/07-44A (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 3,
2007).
108. Id. at 10-18. Notably, Judge McGuirl also found that the governor
had not waived any executive testimonial privilege when he spoke publicly
about his decision: "It does not appear to me to be inconsistent with the
protection the defendants enjoy under our [c]onstitution to allow a witness to
decline to appear and testify before a jury considering this incident, having
made many public statements on the same incident." Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 10-12.
110. Id. at 11-12.
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governor's public statement and Col. Pare's pretrial testimony. 1 '1
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the governor's writ
and heard his appeal on an expedited basis."12 All parties
submitted briefs and argued the scope of the executive privilege, if
any.1 1 3 The state attorney general agreed with the governor that
the court should recognize an executive testimonial privilege, such
that before a "high level government official" must testify, the
testimony sought must be essential, admissible, unavailable from
any other source, and within the witness's direct personal
knowledge."14 The court, however, found that the governor's
testimony was irrelevant to the defendants' excessive force
defense, and therefore did not address whether an executive
testimonial privilege exists.1 1 5 The court based its decision on the
procedural execution of search warrants; specifically, the warrant,
a court order, superseded any order by the governor or Col. Pare
11 6
as "the troopers were bound by the warrant's command."
Additionally, the court noted that the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Graham v. Conner,i i 7 requires the evaluation
of a police officer's actions "from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene."" i8 Consequently, as both the governor and
Col. Pare were not at the smoke-shop on the day of the incident,

111. Id. at 3-4, 12-13.
112. State v. Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278, 1281 (R.I. 2007). See also Mulvaney,
supra note 3.
113. See Governor's Brief, supra note 105; Brief of the Appellees, Thomas,
936 A.2d 1278 (No. 2007-264-M.P.) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief]; Brief of
Designated Party Respondent State of Rhode Island, Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278
(No. 2007-264-M.P.) [hereinafter Attorney General's Brief].
114. Attorney General's Brief, supra note 113, at 13. It seems a conscious
decision from the attorney general to use "high level government official,"
rather than just "governor," for then the privilege could apply to officials such
as the attorney general himself.
115. Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1282-85. It is customary for the court to decide
cases without considering constitutional issues, if possible. See, e.g., Mackie
v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 596 (R.I. 2007) ("In the typical case, this [clourt is
quite reluctant to reach constitutional issues when there are adequate nonconstitutional grounds upon which to base our rulings.") (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 898 A.2d 1234, 1239 (R.I.
2006)).
116. Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1283.
117. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
118. Thomas, 936 A.2d at 1284 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
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neither could have given the officers guidance in light of the
circumstances. 1 19 Thus, the court, unfortunately, 120 left the issue
of whether the governor possessed any executive testimonial
privilege open for debate.
III. ANALYSIS

A. The Textual Problem
For those who prefer the plain meaning, textual approach to
their analysis of the law, the concept of executive privilege surely
disappoints. The Federal Constitution, along with every state
constitution, lacks an express reference to the executive
privilege. 121 When executive privilege is found to exist, it rests on
two principle rationales: separation of powers and the public
interest. Each rationale has its imperfections with respect to
gubernatorial use of executive privilege, especially in Rhode
Island.

119.

Id.

120. The author of this comment strongly disagrees with the basis of the
court's decision. Specifically, if jurors are allowed to weigh the totality of the
circumstances regarding the reasonableness of an officer's actions from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, then there seems to be ample
room for a jury to consider what orders, if any, were given to the officers prior
to arriving on the scene. Would not a reasonable officer on the scene have his
superior's specific orders with regard to the search warrant's execution on his
mind, especially if the superior says the governor commands it? It also seems
that a reasonable officer on the scene would follow subsequent instructions
about how to execute the warrant from superior officers rather than the
previously issued warrant itself. While the court questions whether the
governor's order was ever communicated to the officers at the scene, id. at
1284 n.3, such evidence only need be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. If a proper foundation is not introduced, the trial judge can
instruct the jury to disregard the evidence resting on the conditional fact. See
R.I. R. EVID. 104(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
See also State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1998) ("Rule 104(b)...
provides that the trial justice is not bound by the rules of evidence when
resolving preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence.").
To the court's credit, however, this argument was not sufficiently addressed
by defense counsel. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 113.
121. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Construction and
Application, Under State Law, of Doctrine of "Executive Privilege," 10
A.L.R.4th 355 (1981).
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1. Separation of Powers Rationale
The separation of powers doctrine is essential to the heart of
both the Rhode Island and the federal governments. Separation of
powers is the concept of dividing governmental authority between
three separate but coequal branches: the legislature, the judiciary,
and the executive. 122 This idea of checks and balances between
the three branches has been touted as one of the Founders'
greatest achievements. 123 Most of the Founders were classically
educated and feared all forms of tyranny, which they believed
could come from any government branch that was too powerful. 124
Carl J. Richard explained:
The [F]ounders' immersion in ancient history had a
profound effect upon their style of thought.
They
developed from the classics a suspicious cast of mind.
They learned from the Greeks and Romans to fear
conspiracies against liberty. Steeped in a literature
whose perpetual theme was the steady encroachment of
tyranny on liberty, the founders became virtually
obsessed with spotting its approach, so that they might
avoid the fate of their classical heroes. It has been said of
the American Revolution that never was there a
revolution with so little cause. Whatever his faults,
George III was hardly Caligula or Nero; however
illegitimate, the moderate British taxes were hardly
equivalent to the mass executions of the emperors. But
since the [F]ounders believed that the central lesson of
the classics was that every illegitimate power, however
small, ended in slavery, they were determined to resist
25
every such power. 1

In other words, the classic Greek anti-models influenced the

122.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1369 (7th

123.

See,

e.g., DINESH

D'SouzA,

ed. 1999).

WHAT'S So GREAT ABOUT AMERICA 92-94

(2002); Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
Separation of Powers Address to second year law students at Roger Williams
University School of Law (Apr. 7, 2008) (" [The separation of powers doctrine]
was the Founders' favorite ... [because it] would preserve liberty.").
124. CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME,
AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 118-19 (1994).

125.

Id. (emphasis added).
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Founders to structure a government that made it difficult for one
branch to become too powerful. From such a reading, it seems
quite plausible that, in the Founders' eyes, the idea of executive
privilege would be akin to an illegitimate power of a tyrannical
monarchy.126 Yet, when some of them held the presidency, their
view became a little less clear. 127
The basic argument for the rationale that the separation of
powers doctrine endorses a privilege for the chief executive is that
the judiciary (and the legislature, in the case of a legislative
subpoena) lacks the power to compel the chief executive to
perform any act. 12 8 Modern cases, such as Office of the Governor
v. Select Committee of Inquiry, refute this rationale in light of
federal precedents such as Nixon 1.129 More precisely, no one, not

even the President, is above the law; accordingly, government
executives are subject to the power of courts. 1 30
As one
commentator put it:
Separation of powers was not intended as an end in itself.
Rather, it was considered a means of ensuring
government by laws instead of men. Allowing any public
official to willfully disregard his legal duties in the name
of separation of powers frustrates the very purpose of the
doctrine. 131
This relatively consistent holding by state and federal courts
does not mean courts cannot find support for an executive
privilege, but it does mean the privilege, where found, is qualified
and not absolute.

13 2

In Rhode Island, the traditional view concerning separation of
126. The idea of executive privilege arose from the British monarch's
categorical immunity deriving from divine right rule-i.e. because God
appointed the King or Queen, he or she was only answerable to God. See
GODFREY DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS: 1603-1660, at 31-32 (2d ed. 1959)

(explaining King James I's articulation of divine right rule before he became
king). A telling passage from James I: "[A] good king will frame all his
actions according to the law, yet he is not bound thereto but of his own good

will." Id.
127. See supra Part I discussion of George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson's utilization of some kind of executive privilege.
128. Farber, supra note 48, at 633-34.
129. 858 A.2d 709, 734-40 (Conn. 2004).
130. See id. at 734 (discussing Nixon I and Burr).
131. Farber, supra note 48, at 635 (footnote call numbers omitted).
132. See Part II.A-B.
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powers is that "the General Assembly's power is not limited to the
powers specifically enumerated whereas the [g]overnor's authority
is so limited." 13 3 The separation of powers amendment arguably
changed this by repealing the reserved powers clause, 13 4 because
now the legislature no longer possesses any implied powers.
However, since there was no similar grant of implied powers to
the executive branch, the governor remains limited to powers
specifically enumerated in the state constitution. 135
Therefore, before the 2004 amendment, the governor's power
(including privileges) was restricted by the express grants of the
Rhode Island Constitution, meaning that he or she could not
exercise any implied powers. Logically, it should follow that after
the General Assembly's implied powers were repealed, and
without a similar grant of implied powers to the executive branch,
the governor still cannot exercise any other power that is not
specifically granted to him or her. Recently, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held in Gaumond that it would not recognize nor
create a "school-disabled student privilege."' 136 Any new privilege,
13 7
the decision implies, would need to be expressly enacted.
Consequently, because (1) the executive was limited to the express
powers in the Rhode Island Constitution before the separation of
powers amendment; (2) the executive was not expressly granted
any implied powers by the amendment; and (3) the Rhode Island
Supreme Court subsequently held that any new privilege would
need to be expressly enacted, there can be no implied basis for an
executive privilege in Rhode Island.

133. Narragansett Indian Tribe of R.I. v. State, 667 A.2d 280, 282 (R.I.
1995).
134. R.I. CONST. art VI, § 10 (repealed 2004).
135. The amendment amended article IX, section 5, giving the governor
the power to make appointments with the advice and consent of the senate.
R.I. CONST. art IX, § 5. However, as it is an express power, it is not the
equivalent of replacing article VI, section 10.
Essentially, such an
amendment would read something similar to: "The governor shall continue to
exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this
Constitution." Cf. R.I. CONST. art VI, § 10 (repealed 2004).
136. 909 A.2d 512, 516 (R.I. 2006).
137. Id. The court seems to imply that the General Assembly could create

new privileges by statute. Id. at 517. However, because of possible due
process concerns regarding privileges, to be discussed in infra Part III.D, a
constitutional amendment may be necessary.
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2. The Public Interest Rationale
Presidents and governors alike will often speak of how their
every act is for the public interest-especially on the campaign
trail. The Ohio Supreme Court arguably recognized this in Dann I
when it established a gubernatorial executive privilege: "It is for
the benefit of the public that we recognize this qualified privilege
and not for the benefit of the individuals who hold, or will hold,
the office of governor of the state of Ohio." 1 38 The court held that
such a privilege was necessary to protect the public interest, as it
would make certain that the governor could "operate in a frank,
open, and candid environment in which information and
conflicting ideas, thoughts, and opinions may be vigorously
presented to the governor without concern that unwanted
consequences will follow from public dissemination." 13 9 In a
footnote, the court blended the public interest rationale with the
separation of powers doctrine:
More recently, the [United States Supreme Court] noted
that the "public interest requires that a coequal branch of
[government afford [p]residential confidentiality the
greatest
protection
consistent
with
the
fair
administration of justice .

.

. and give recognition to the

paramount necessity of protecting the [e]xecutive
[b]ranch from vexatious litigation that might distract it
from the energetic performance of its constitutional
1 40
duties."
Not only does this sound like the rationale behind the
deliberative-process privilege, which the court was not
reviewing, 14 1 but the court also seemed to imply that political
fallout for a governor is not in the public interest. To put it
another way, rather than let the political processes work for the
public interest via a better informed electorate through public
dissemination of gubernatorial decisions, the court instead held, in
a paternalistic manner, that the governor will know what
information is proper to publicize. With decisions like this, giving
138. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 484 (Ohio 2006).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 484 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004)).
141. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d at 480.
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courts, as well as executive officials, the power to weigh the public
interest in disclosure is indeed dangerous.
The people of Rhode Island have seen glimpses of what can
1 42
happen behind closed government doors over the years.
Former Providence Mayor Vincent "Buddy" Cianci's conviction in
the Plunder Dome scandal in the 1990s, 14 3 and former Rhode
Island House majority leader Gerard M. Martineau's recent guilty
plea to selling his office to CVS Pharmacy and Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Rhode Island, 14 4 probably makes the public wonder what
information is being withheld--or if an executive privilege were
recognized, what would not be disclosed. In other words, it
appears that the public interest would be better served without an
executive privilege, especially in Rhode Island.
B. The Proposed Solution-A Deliberative-Process Privilege
While a satisfactory rationale for the gubernatorial executive
privilege may not exist, the need for administrative efficiency
dictates that a common-law privilege may be useful-the
deliberative-process privilege. The purpose of this privilege is to
protect the mental processes of government decisionmakers from
interference, permitting them to engage in free, frank, and open
exchange of opinions and recommendations without being
inhibited by fear of later public disclosure. 14 5 In order for
something to be privileged under the deliberative-process
14 6
privilege, it must be both predecisional and deliberative, 14 7
whereas executive privilege is potentially all encompassing.
Predecisional material contributes to a particular decision or
policy. 14 8

Deliberative

material

is

the

opinions

and

142. The depth of corruption in the Rhode Island government may never
be known.
143. See STANTON, supra note 8, at 382.
144.

See Mike Stanton, State House Influence Peddling - Martineau

Pleads Guilty - Ex-Rep. Admits Selling Office to CVS, Blue Cross,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 3, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 21928282.
145. Gwich'in Steering Comm. v. State, Office of the Governor, 10 P.3d
572, 578 (Alaska 2000).
146. Id. at 579.
147. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing
presidential
and
deliberative-process
the
between
differences
communications privileges).
148. Gwichin Steering Comm., 10 P.3d at 579; Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at
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recommendations comprising the formulation of decisions or
policies-the "give-and-take" of decisionmaking.1 49 For instance,
in Thomas, an executive privilege would protect the discussions
that Governor Carcieri and Col. Pare had about the smoke-shop,
as well as whatever plan they may have formulated to execute the
search warrant.
On the other hand, a deliberative-process
privilege would protect only the discussions they had prior to the
decision; the plan they eventually formulated would not be
protected.
State and federal courts have had a tendency to confuse the
two privileges.1 5 0 The problem is that those who want to justify
an executive privilege through a common-law rationale often find
themselves repeating the rationale for the deliberative-process
privilege. For instance, in Dann I, after stating it would not rule
on the governor's deliberative-process privilege claim, 15 1 the court
proceeded to ground a qualified executive privilege using the
rationale for the deliberative-process privilege: "Recognition of a
qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege advances the
same interests advanced by the analogous presidential privilege,
including the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt
1 52
or harsh opinions in executive decisionmaking."'
The deliberative-process privilege is preferable to any
executive privilege for four intertwined reasons.
First, the
deliberative-process privilege is limited in scope, as it only
protects materials that are predecisional and deliberative.
Protecting predecisional material helps ensure better-informed
decisionmaking. Post-decisional material has no effect on the
decision and is thus not privileged. Additionally, by protecting
materials that are deliberative, opinions, recommendations, and
advice about a policy can be spoken freely. Note, however, that
purely factual material, such as the policy or decision itself, is not
privileged. 153 The ultimate policy or decision is the "end game," or
737.
149. Gwichin Steering Comm., 10 P.3d at 579; Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at
737.
150. See, e.g., City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1046-49
(Colo. 1998) (surveying federal and state court precedents that refer to
deliberative-process privilege as executive privilege).
151. Dann I, 848 N.E.2d 472, 480 (Ohio 2006).
152.
153.

Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.
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the result of predecisional and deliberative discussions. While
problems may result as to identifying a "decision" in some
circumstances, in camera review by judges and evolving precedent
will help shape the bounds of this privilege.
The second reason why the deliberative-process privilege is
preferable is that it applies government-wide, not just for one
person or small group, such as the governor and his staff. While
some may be alarmed at this realization, fearing that the
government could become even more corrupt, the scope of the
privilege is very limited. Politicians will still be responsible for
their ultimate decisions on matters.
A third reason to prefer a deliberative-process privilege is that
it is qualified: if the material is found to be both predecisional and
deliberative, the privilege can still be overcome if the seeker's
interests in disclosure outweigh the incidental right of the
For
government to be free from unreasonable interference.
instance, in a criminal case, a defendant's due process rights will
more than likely overcome the government's need to be candid
behind closed doors.
An additional reason to adopt a deliberative-process privilege
in Rhode Island is implementation. As discussed earlier, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court will not recognize or create any new
privileges. 154 Nor does the Rhode Island Constitution allow any
implied powers for any of the three government branches
following the 2004 separation of powers amendment. 155
Additionally, the General Assembly may not be able to enact the
privilege on its own, as it would also be granting itself the
privilege, and if drafted incorrectly, the privilege could be found
unconstitutional on the ground that it violates due process
principles. For instance, in criminal cases, the privilege could
prevent a defendant from presenting a full defense. To address
these problems, the deliberative-process privilege would have to
be ratified through an amendment to the Rhode Island
Constitution. Most would probably view this as a problem in
itself, as any amendment would have to be carefully worded and
an advisory opinion from the Rhode Island Supreme Court would
probably be necessary. Yet, the amendment process would ensure
154.
155.

See supraPart II.D.
See supra Parts III.B, ID.
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that the privilege would be truly desirable by the people of Rhode
Island. Then, if the amendment is enacted correctly, everyone
wins-those in government positions have their decisionmaking
processes protected, while state citizens can hold public officials
accountable for their actions and decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION

If the proposed deliberative-process privilege does nothing
else, it will at least give boundaries that the current, nebulous
executive privilege lacks. It truly is unfortunate that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court left the executive privilege issue open.
Knowing Rhode Island, however, another instance should arise
when an executive's use of privilege should be challenged.
Executive privilege will continue to be a contentious issue
throughout the country, so long as there are politicians with
something to hide. It has been over thirty years since the
Watergate tape scandal, yet executive privilege seems to be as
amorphous as ever. Political reforms, whether they are state or
federal constitutional amendments, or simply better politicians,
are needed more than ever. The mixed government with checks
and balances that the Founders envisioned and implemented,
having studied history before them, will deteriorate into tyranny if
people continue to pervert the separation of powers doctrine to
further their own ends. The safeguards are in place to prevent
such a fate, but action is necessary for those defenses to be
effective. In the interim, it may simply be that a governor saves
some political backlash and the excessive force defense is harder
to prove. Perhaps it will take years, but eventually, if executive
power is strengthened by an unchecked executive privilege,
consequences will lie in store for Rhode Island as a whole. The
Founders' lessons from the classics should not be lost: "[E]very
illegitimate power, however small, end[s] in slavery." 156

156.

Richard, supra note 124, at 119.
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